I. INTRODUCTION
his article explores the interpretation and construction 1 of executive orders using as examples President Trump's two executive orders captioned "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (the "Two Executive Orders"). Litigation followed the first of the Two Executive Orders, and President Trump issued the second of the Two Executive Orders as a replacement for the first. 5 Litigation then followed the second of the Two Executive Orders. 6 Expressing "no view on the merits," the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the litigation with instructions to dismiss the litigation as moot because relevant provisions of that executive order had expired. 7 Despite their current status, however, the Two Executive Orders remain highly instructive for those exploring the interpretation and construction of executive orders in general. The Two Executive Orders also provide critical context for any subsequent executive orders issued by President Trump restricting travel.
Using insights from the semiotic subfield of pragmatics, 8 a semiotic subfield which explores how real-world people actually use, interpret, and construe language in various real-world contexts (including contexts where the individual issuing the order also claims "Islam hates us" and tweets "TRAVEL BAN!" 9 ), this article therefore explores the Two Executive Orders in detail. In doing so, this article examines why reasonable judges thoroughly versed in legal theory, legal practice, and pragmatics should conclude that President Trump 
See, e.g., Pragmatics, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016). The semiotic subfield of pragmatics involves " [t] he study of language as it is used in a social context, including its effect on the interlocutors" and " [t] he branch of semiotics that deals with the relationship between signs, especially words and other elements of language and their users." Id. By "semiotics" I mean "the study of signs" which "involves both the theory and analysis of signs, codes and signifying processes." DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 259 (2d ed. 2007). A "sign" is defined as "a meaningful unit which is interpreted as 'standing for' something other than itself." Id. at 260. I have explored signs and how they work in more detail and will not repeat those details here. See Before turning to the Two Executive Orders themselves, a brief look at simpler private executive orders provides a useful lead-in. Imagine, for example, a company supervisor who frequently uses the phrase "It's a full moon tonight" to mean she expects everyone to work late that night. Consistent with basic principles of pragmatics, 12 seasoned employees understand that company context drives meaning here. In this company context, they know that "It's a full moon tonight" is an order to work late that night. In such a company context, they know that "speaker meaning" differs from dictionary or facial meaning here to the extent the latter would speak of moons and not overtime. Furthermore, even new employees generally know that supervisors can make verbal errors or otherwise speak imprecisely from time to time. In those cases too, employees who want to keep their jobs would want to follow the supervisor's speaker meaning if lawful. For example, if the supervisor means "go right" by "go write," such employees would want to figure that out and go right instead of grabbing a pen. Thus, again, real-world language use would deviate from dictionary or other model usage. As these simple examples thus show, interpretation of "executive orders" requires an understanding of context, a topic further explored in Sections II.B and II.C below.
ii. Construction and Further Effects of 
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Meaning
The simple examples above also help us parse a further useful distinction before exploring the Two Executive Orders further. Law-abiding employees will not willingly obey unlawful orders. Thus, law-abiding employees will not merely interpret their supervisor's words to determine the speaker meaning. They will also construe that speaker's meaning by considering its legal effect. As Professor Lawrence B. Solum analyzes the difference here: "[I]nterpretation recognizes or discovers the linguistic meaning of an authoritative legal text."
13 Construction, on the other hand, "gives legal effect to the semantic content of a legal text." 14 For example, if the supervisor above emails the "full moon" language to instruct junior supervisors to require their hourly employees to work off the clock and avoid overtime pay, law-abiding junior supervisors will not only interpret the order but will also construe it as unlawful. In so doing, they will refuse to obey the unlawful order. They will, of course, understand that using the "full moon" language as cover in an email trail does not make the order lawful. 15 
B. The Individual Public Boss
With insight from these simple private law examples, one can now turn to presidential and other public officials' orders. 13 . Lawrence Here too, one must first interpret the speaker's meaning before one can construe it. If, for example, the President uses the word "fire" in an order, one must determine whether he means a flame, the discharge of someone from employment, or perhaps something else. 16 After interpreting the President's order in its relevant context, one can then construe the legal effect of the order.
17
In the case of the Two Executive Orders, one must therefore first explore what President Trump meant to say in the applicable context. That is, one must first interpret the text. Once one has so interpreted the text, one can then construe it by exploring its legal effect.
18
C. Context and the Meaning of Executive Orders
As these examples show, context is critical to the interpretation and construction of executive orders (and any other text). Before delving further into the Two Executive Orders, one must therefore have a basic understanding of context. In its broadest sense, context includes "all the circumstances that go 17. The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 13, at 111-12; see also infra Section II.C.
18. See infra Sections III, IV, and V for a discussion of such interpretation and construction. As I hope to discuss in a future article, exploring the interpretation and construction of individual speaker meaning also provides insights into legislative speaker meaning. Confounded by the multiple minds and motives legislators bring to legislation, many have despaired of ever finding any speaker meaning or intent of a legislature with multiple legislators. 1989 ) (summarizing and diagramming how "a bill becomes a law"). Though legislators' thoughts, statements, and motives can be evidence of the meaning of such adopted proposals, legislators' thoughts, statements, and motives should not be confused with the adopted proposals themselves whose interpretation and construction become questions for the reasonable judge thoroughly versed in legal theory, legal practice, and semiotics (including pragmatics) explored in more detail in Section V below.
These circumstances include cognitive contexts such as the "store of knowledge and remembered experiences which forms a background against which utterances are processed . . . and which can affect how meanings are construed." 20 For example, when an artist speaks of his "favorite brush," he may well mean a tool for applying paint, though a barber using the same phrase may mean a tool for working human hair. Less innocuously, for example, "East-side children" may mean Muslim children to a person who has perceived the eastern part of her town as primarily Muslim.
Additionally, context includes any relevant preceding discourse context. 21 "It is behind the middle door," for example, can have widely different meanings depending on what was said earlier. The logically-possible meanings are of course endless: a cat, an umbrella, a book, two books, a sofa, and so on. To determine the meaning, we need to consider what was said or asked before. For example, "Where is the cat?" would lead to a very different meaning for "it" than would a preceding question such as "Do you have an umbrella that I can borrow?" Less innocuously, "East-side children" could mean Muslims when used by a person who has previously told us that the eastern part of her town is primarily Muslim.
Social, cultural, and other human contexts can also exist at broader community levels. As Judge Easterbrook notes, "You don't have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful communication depends on meanings shared by interpretive communities." 22 If, for example, a speaker is addressing a group that she knows equates Iraqis with Muslims, that might be evidence that the term "Iraqi" means "Muslim" for that speaker. A word changes meaning when it becomes part of a sentence, the sentence when it becomes part of a paragraph. A longer writing similarly affects the paragraph, other related writings affect the particular writing, and the circumstances affect the whole. 24 Therefore, finding speaker meaning involves careful analysis of surrounding text. It also, of course, involves determining what counts as applicable text, an analysis which I have explored in detail elsewhere. 25 For example, the surrounding text can tell us that "read" is in the past tense in "He read the book," while it is in the future tense in "We will read the book." Furthermore, "East-side children" may well mean Muslims if the phrase is contained in an e-mail where prior sentences repeatedly equate "East-side children" with Muslims.
Finally, context also includes applicable purposes and policies. In evaluating purpose context, I use "purpose" to mean a speaker's "objective, goal, or end," 26 or the "general rationale" 27 for her text. The importance of purpose in determining speaker meaning is self-evident. For example, how can we determine the meaning of a phrase such as "Take this book" without reference to the speaker's purpose? Is the speaker giving away the book or is he merely asking someone to hold the book? That question cannot be answered without reference to the speaker's purpose. meaning, it might help to note that even so-called "axioms" or "necessary statements" are not immune to the effects and requirements of context to determine meaning. Take for example the following: "x + y" = "y + x." Although we might first think this formula is clear on its face without any need to go outside the four corners of the text, this initial thought quickly breaks down. We must assign meaning to "+" and "=" which can vary. Does "+" mean we are combining x and y into a unity, into something else, or treating them as a collection? Are we using "+" in the sense of "1 + 1 gives us 2" or are we using the "+" in the sense of "a chair + a couch gives us a minimally furnished room"? How we use "+" in either such case drives the meaning of "=". The potential effect of context does not end here. Are we operating under the assumption, for example, that listing something first highlights the first-listed thing? If so, then neither "couch + chair" = "chair + couch" nor "x + y" = "y + x" would be true. See ANDREW HODGES, ALAN TURING: THE ENIGMA 104-10 (1983) (providing an excellent biographical discussion of the development of forms of "algebra"). As some of the above examples show, speakers sometimes "encode" or "disguise" their speech for various reasons including (without limitation) attempted covering of unlawful or questionable directives ("It's a full moon tonight" as a directive to work overtime without proper compensation) and attempted compliance with social demands for politeness (referring to Muslims as "East-side children" rather than singling them out by their religion).
39
The latter example involves a principle of politeness that is central to pragmatics. 40 Since speech is a social activity, it makes little sense to unnecessarily offend or irritate others; therefore, most rational speakers prefer polite to impolite or offensive words where reasonably possible. 41 Thus, the parent who referred to Muslim children as "East-side children" may well have used this less-direct reference to Muslims because the parent considered that language more polite than a direct reference to Muslim children. When the principle of politeness comes into play in such a manner, we must consider whether it is used for social purposes rather than to change the meaning of references. If contextual and other evidence indicates the parent meant to refer to Muslim children, we should of course understand the effects of the principle of politeness and not be confused by the resulting indirect references to "East-side children" rather than to "Muslims." Similarly, if contextual or other evidence indicates that referencing Muslim nations is more "polite" than a reference to Muslims as a people, we should interpret the words accordingly. As we consider such various forms of indirect reference, we should also recognize the concept of anaphora, which points backwards in time to some antecedent. 42 For example, if while drafting a contract we define the term "European Nations" to mean "all countries having any territory in Europe as of June 30, 2017," subsequent usage of "European Nations" in the contract will reach back to that definition. Anaphora can also exist in less express ways. 43 If, for example, a speaker's prior references contextually tie "East-side children" to Muslim children, that would be no less anaphora than the use of "European Nations" in the above contract example. 44 Similarly, if references to certain predominantly-Muslim countries can be contextually tied into prior references to Muslims, we might well have anaphora and thus references to Muslims, despite the literal failure to use such a term.
Trump's Use of Indirection and Anaphora
Mr. Trump Not only did candidate Trump state his plan to ban Muslims in the language above, he stated outright his plan to use indirect encoding to cover that plan. He told us it is "okay" that "you can't use the word Muslim" because he's now "talking territory instead of Muslim."
48 He also told us: "Remember this."
49
That statement is also quite important because it turns territory references into anaphora for Muslims to the extent Trump is expressly telling us to remember future references to territory will refer back to his planned ban of Muslims. 
Relevance and Balance
Finally, as we consider various forms for direct and indirect reference, we must also recognize the principles of relevance and balance often at play in discourse. Where we believe a speaker wishes to be relevant, to act lawfully, and to act otherwise in good faith, we by definition assume that the speaker does not mean to speak erroneously, misleadingly, unlawfully, irrationally, or incoherently even if the speaker's words can on their face be taken as such. 51 Where we believe the speaker wishes to be relevant and to act in good faith, we therefore prefer interpretation and construction resulting in accuracy, lawfulness, rationality, and coherence, unless we have good reason to interpret and construe otherwise. Preferring such interpretations is what I shall call applying the "principle of balance" 52 when interpreting and construing words where we believe the speaker means to be relevant and is otherwise acting in good faith. 53 that "an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
52. See, e.g., GRICE, supra note 40, at 26 ("Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.").
53. See id.; Law's "Way of Words," supra note 8, at 236. that an interpreter who finds statements of his that seem at odds with the remainder of a piece: "[I would hope that an interpreter] could figure out which statement did fit my overall position best and which reflected a lapse in how I have expressed myself" and would therefore say "'Greenawalt probably means X (or would think X) though one of his sentences points in a different direction.'" 54 Of course, where context or other evidence indicates otherwise, the presumption of balance is rebutted. In Section IV.C.3 below, I explore the principle of balance in the context of President Trump's executive orders.
ii. The First Executive Order Consistent with his promises of "talking territory instead of Muslim" and the other background and context discussed above, on January 27, 2017, President Trump issued his first executive order (the "First Executive Order"). 55 That Order "immediately suspended for ninety days the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry of foreign aliens from seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen." focused on, instead of religion, danger-the areas of the world that create danger for us. . . . It's based on places where there [is] substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into our country. 58 Additionally, the First Executive Order included phrases such as "honor killings" and "persecution of those who practice religions different from their own."
59 Section 1 of the First Executive Order, in describing its purpose, stated: "the United States should not admit those who engage in acts of bigotry or hatred (including "honor" killings, other forms of violence against women, or the persecution of those who practice religions different from their own). . . ."
60 "Numerous amici" in the case claim that such language involves stereotypes that Muslims are intolerant of other religions, and that Muslims kill family members to preserve family honor. 61 To the extent such language does this, it can serve as direct (if, for example, "their own" is understood in context to mean "Muslims' own") or at least indirect references to Muslims.
The First Executive Order also included language that, as a logical matter, singled out Muslims. The First Executive Order provided that refugees may be admitted into the United States on a case-by-case basis in the discretion of the Secretaries of State and Homeland Defense, "but only so long as they determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in the national interest including when the person is a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious persecution."
62 Religious minorities subject to this exception are by definition non-Muslim because the territories referenced are all majority-Muslim nations. Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion. That order was not motivated by animus toward any religion, but was instead intended to protect the ability of religious minorities whoever they are and wherever they reside to avail themselves of the [ actions were blocked by judges, in my opinion, incorrect, and unsafe ruling [sic] ," and then announced that he would be issuing a new executive action the following week. 68 The President vowed, "I will not back down from defending our country. I got elected on defense of our country. I keep my campaign promises, and our citizens will be very happy when they see the result." 69 Consistent with President's Trump's statement that he keeps his campaign promises, both he and his agents made it clear that they saw the second order as substantially the same as the first. Stephen Miller, the President's Senior Policy Advisor, claimed the second order would contain "mostly minor technical differences" producing the "same basic policy outcome for the country."
70 Sean Spicer, White House Press Secretary, also affirmed that "The principles of the executive order remain the same," and President Trump in a rally stated that the second order was "a watered-down version of the first order." and Analysis found that the majority of foreign-born, U.S. violent extremists are radicalized several years after entering the United States. 74 As such, the DHS report concluded that the ability of increased screening and vetting to reduce terrorism-related activity is limited. 75 Additionally, ten former national security, foreign policy, and intelligence officials filed a joint declaration to the Ninth Circuit that stated, "There is no national security purpose for a total bar on entry for aliens from the In light of the conditions in [Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen], until the assessment of current screening and vetting procedures required by section 2 of this order is completed, the risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one of these countries who intends to commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the national security of the United States is unacceptably high. Accordingly, while that assessment is ongoing, I am imposing a temporary pause on the entry of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, subject to categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers, as described in section 3 of this order. issuance of a visa to, or to permit the entry of, a foreign national for whom entry is otherwise suspended if the foreign national has demonstrated to the officer's satisfaction that denying entry during the suspension period would cause undue hardship, and that his or her entry would not pose a threat to national security and would be in the national interest. 
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In its review, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the First Amendment Establishment Clause claim because the district court relied upon that claim in enjoining Section 2 (c) of the Second Executive Order. 87 In performing this review, the Fourth Circuit relied on Kleindienst v. Mandel 88 and held that "[t]he government need only show that the challenged action is 'facially legitimate and bona fide' to defeat a constitutional challenge."
89
The Fourth Circuit read the facial legitimacy requirement here to mean "there must be a valid reason for the challenged action stated on the face of the action," 90 and found that the "stated purpose" of the Second Executive Order, "to protect the Nation from terrorist activities by foreign nationals admitted to the United States," satisfied this requirement of facial legitimacy. Id . One migh,t of course, wonder why stating a "valid reason" cannot be offset by other countervailing matters discussed, for example, in Section IV.B. below. Given Trump's remarks about Muslims discussed in this article, one might also wonder why "Muslims" is not a reasonable reading of "foreign nationals." See infra Section IV.B. (discussing problems with the notion of "facial" meaning).
91. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591.
As for the bona fide requirement, the Fourth Circuit relied upon language from Justice Kennedy in a separate opinion in Kerry v. Din 92 to hold that:
[W]here a plaintiff makes 'an affirmative showing of bad faith' that is 'plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity,' courts may 'look behind' the challenged action to assess its 'facially legitimate' justification.
93
Applying this understanding of the bona fide test, the Fourth Circuit had little trouble finding that Plaintiffs had met their burden of proof. The Fourth Circuit noted, among other things, the following evidence: Trump's many campaign statements "expressing animus towards the Islamic faith;" his proposal to ban Muslims from the United States; his subsequent words that he would do this by focusing on "territories" rather than Muslims directly; the First Executive Order targeting several predominately-Muslim nations with preferences for minority religions; a statement by an advisor that Trump requested him to find a means to ban Muslims in a lawful way; the Second Executive Order resembling the first and described by President Trump and his advisors as maintaining the same policy goals of the First Executive Order; and what the Fourth Circuit considered as "comparably weak evidence" that the purpose of the Second Executive Order is "to address national security interests." 94 The court also noted "the exclusion of national security agencies from the decision-making process, the post hoc nature of the national security rationale, and evidence from DHS that [ In evaluating the first prong of Lemon here, the Fourth Circuit followed several of the basic principles of pragmatics noted above. For example, it recognized that it should act: as a reasonable, "objective observer," taking into account "the traditional external signs that show up in the 'text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,' or comparable official act."
100
The court also recognized that:
[In such capacity, a court] also considers the action's "historical context" and "the specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage." And as a reasonable observer, a court has a "reasonable memor[y]," and it cannot "'turn a blind eye to the context in which [the action] arose.'" 101 As a "reasonable observer" reviewing the evidence and context set out above, the Fourth Circuit unsurprisingly found a "compelling case" that the primary purpose of the Second Executive Order was religious.
102 In addition to, or further elaborating upon, the matters mentioned above, the court considered Mr. Trump Additionally, the court focused on Mr. Trump's suggestion that he would refer to territories instead of religion in an attempt to avoid scrutiny of a "Muslim ban," including Trump's response "So you call it territories. OK? We're gonna do territories" when faced with the claim that "Calls to ban Muslims from entering the U.S. are offensive and unconstitutional." 107 The court further noted Mr. Trump's assertion that entry to the United States ought to be "immediately suspend [ed] . . . from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism," and that when he was asked "whether this meant he was 'roll[ing] back' his call for a Muslim ban, he said his plan was an 'expansion' and explained that '[p]eople were so upset when I used the word Muslim, so he was instead 'talking territory instead of Muslim. '" 108 The court also considered the consistent narrative that followed after Mr. Trump himself from coverage). 116 The Government filed a petition for writ of certiorari on June 1, 2017. Arguments addressing matters explored by the Fourth Circuit include (among others) 127 the following: First, petitioners argue that Mandel and Din did not allow the Fourth Circuit "to examine whether the President's stated reason [for the executive orders] was given 'in good faith'" and that the president "need only determine that, in his judgment, entry 'would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.'" 128 The Fourth Circuit's quite reasonable analysis to the contrary is set forth in Section III.A.4 above and my further challenges to Mandel are set forth in Section IV below.
Second, Petitioners further claim that the text of Section 2(c) of the Second Executive Order "does not refer to or draw any distinction based on religion," the order "is religion-neutral [applying] to six countries based on national-security risk," and the order "applies to certain nationals of those countries without 122. Id Third, Petitioners argue that such campaign statements should not be considered here because taking the Presidential oath "marks a profound transition from private life to the Nation's highest public office, and manifests the singular responsibility and independent authority to protect security and welfare of the Nation that the Constitution reposes in the President."
133 Though such words may be lofty, they make little sense in light of the need as discussed in Section II.C above to consider all relevant context when interpreting text. Further, they make little sense in light of President Trump's view that his oath of office permits, again, such tweets as "People, the lawyers and the courts can call it whatever they want, but I am calling it what we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!" 134 Additionally, of course, it is hard to see how such a tweet does not reincorporate by reference prior campaign statements discussed above even if they would otherwise have been somehow magically erased from consideration by the oath of office. Finally, it is also hard to see how such a tweet does not belie any underlying argument here that a Prince Hal in his seventies has suddenly changed in ways that restart context and language anew once that septuagenarian Prince Hal has taken office. 135 Fourth, Petitioners also argue that allowing campaign statements to be considered will result in "no rational limit" where even a "college essay" could be considered in interpretation.
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This slippery slope argument is addressed further in Section IV.C.2 below.
Fifth, Petitioners, citing Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Commission, 137 argue that "courts are generally 'ill equipped to determine the[] authenticity and utterly unable to assess the[] adequacy' of the Executive's 'reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat.'" 138 However, the work of the Fourth Circuit discussed in this article on its face goes far to challenge such claims. Additionally, I discuss in Section V below the critical role that a reasonable judge thoroughly versed in legal theory, legal practice, and semiotics (including pragmatics) must play in the determination of speaker meaning.
Sixth, petitioners note the Second Executive Order's removal of "provisions aimed at aiding victims of religious persecution," 139 which, as discussed in Section III.A.2 above, effectively only benefitted non-Muslims. 140 Although petitioners claim that the purpose of this removal was "to make clear that national security, not religion is the [Second Executive Order's] focus," 141 this seems at best a small effort in light of broad claims discussed in Section III.A.3 above that the Second Executive Order would contain "mostly minor technical differences" producing the "same basic policy outcome for the country." 142 Additionally, if removal of a provision designed to benefit only non-Muslims is considered a "minor technical difference" by President Trump's administration, does this not underscore claims 135 . See 
A. Pragmatics, the Fourth Circuit, and McCreary County
Although the Court dismissed the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit actions on mootness grounds, 145 much can still be learned from the Fourth Circuit's analysis in particular. After the Fourth Circuit had jumped through the hoops of Mandel as it understood them, the court no doubt found the true speaker meaning and purpose of the executive orders: "to effectuate the promised Muslim ban" which prompted changes in the Second Executive Order "to help it survive judicial scrutiny, rather than to avoid targeting Muslims for exclusion from the United States." 146 I say "no doubt" here because President Trump himself confirmed this in a later tweet: "People, the lawyers and the courts can call it Just as the reasonable observer's "world is not made brand new every morning," nor are we able to awake without the vivid memory of these [campaign or other] statements. We cannot shut our eyes to such evidence when it stares us in the face, for "there's none so blind as they that won't see." If and when future courts are confronted with campaign or other statements proffered as evidence of governmental purpose, those courts must similarly determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether such statements are probative evidence of governmental purpose.
150
In addition to the foregoing, one can also elaborate further pragmatics and other considerations that were involved (or should have been involved) in interpreting and then construing President Trump's executive orders. I do this in Sections IV.B. and C and Section V below.
B. The Second Executive Order and Facial Legitimacy
Bound by Mandel's precedent, the Fourth Circuit was forced to use the notion of facial legitimacy 151 152 The court took heed of the Plaintiffs' claim that the Second Executive Order's reference to "honor killings":
[I]ncorporates "a stereotype about Muslims that the President had invoked in the months preceding the Order." [Their brief reproduces] Trump's remarks in a September 2016 speech in Arizona in which he stated that applicants from countries like Iraq and Afghanistan would be "asked their views about honor killings," because "a majority of residents [in those countries] say that the barbaric practice of honor killings against women are often or sometimes justified"). Numerous amici explain that invoking the specter of "honor killings" is a wellworn tactic for stigmatizing and demeaning Islam and painting the religion, and its men, as violent and barbaric. The Amici Constitutional Law Scholars go so far as to call the reference to honor killings "anti-Islamic dog-whistling." 153 Undoubtedly understanding that words' meaning depends upon context, 154 the court correctly found this "honor killings" text to be "yet another marker that [the Second Executive Order's] national security purpose is secondary to its religious purpose."
155
Of course, one could find other possible textual "markers" of such religious purpose. For example, the Second Executive challenged action is 'facially legitimate and bona fide' to defeat a constitutional challenge." Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 590. The Fourth Circuit read the facial legitimacy requirement to mean that "there must be a valid reason for the challenged action stated on the face of the action," and it found that the stated purpose of the Second Executive Order, "to protect the Nation from terrorist activities by foreign nationals admitted to the United States," satisfied this requirement of facial legitimacy. Id. at 590-91. The court then engaged in the separate analysis "bona fide" purpose analysis discussed in Section III above. For the reasons discussed in Section II.C. above and the remainder of Section IV, Mandel is flawed to the extent it assumes text has meaning apart from context. the world as well, a world which includes the well-known fact that Iran is a predominately-Muslim nation. 162 Looking back out into the world for context also raises at least three further issues for Mandel 163 or any other test that might require finding facial legitimacy where no such meaning (legitimate or otherwise) exists out in the world of actual context. First, when looking back out into that world of context, we encounter Mr. Trump's remarks about Muslims and his talk of substituting territory discourse for discourse about Muslims. 164 Given his express substitution of territory talk here for religious talk, how can there not be a strong argument that a list of predominantly-Muslim nations is directed at Muslims? Even worse, given Mr. Trump's remarks about Muslims discussed in this article, how can there not be a strong argument that "Muslims" is what Mr. Trump meant by the phrase "foreign nationals"?
Second, and more generally, given the importance of context in determining meaning, how can we ever sensibly speak of facial legitimacy in any reasonable sense that does not look beyond text to context? 165 Even a simple statement such as "X = X" cannot have plain meaning apart from context. For example, are we saying the letter "X" is the same as the letter "X"? Or are we making the algebraic statement that any number equals itself? Or are we making the broader logical point that anything equals itself? Only context can give us the answer. I have written elsewhere about the problems plaguing "plain meaning" of texts 166 and will not address those questions further here. Third, as a matter of respect for the rule of law and the office of the Presidency itself, we should be wary of tests that lead us away from the President's actual speaker meaning. To the extent we deviate in the process of interpretation from the President's speaker meaning, we are of course no longer listening to the President. This cannot be lawful since only the President has the lawful authority to issue such presidential executive orders. 167 Again, however, this is not to say that we must construe such orders as lawful. As noted above, interpretation and construction are different exercises. 168 Instead, we give proper respect to the office of the Presidency when we interpret the President's words accurately, a proper respect which also requires us to construe any unlawful meaning or purpose accordingly. To the extent cases like Mandel create hurdles to addressing speaker meaning (such as requiring proof of bad faith before we can dig deeper and "look behind" 169 into actual speaker meaning) we should therefore reconsider such cases. 1329, 1388 (1997) . By analogy, the same principle would apply to executive orders of the President. Unless the principle of balance directs otherwise, respect for the office of the Presidency requires that we take evidence suggesting unlawful speaker meaning to suggest such unlawful meaning. In such case, we would run counter to the rule of law in the manner Prof. Sinclair describes should we substitute other more palatable meaning for that of the President. Instead, rule of law requires us to address the unlawfulness of any such speaker meaning through the process of construction. See supra notes 13 and 14 on the distinction between interpretation and construction; see also supra Section III.A.1.b.iii and infra Section IV.C.3. discussing the applicability or inapplicability of the principle of balance.
C. Pragmatics and Four Potential Red Herrings
168. See (i) The speaker normally has a purpose in communicating.
(ii) The speaker constructs a message to be communicated.
(iii) The speaker constructs an utterance with which to convey the message.
( There is no doubt that President Trump has created a burden of suspicion for himself going forward when he deals with travel from Muslim nations. However, the Fourth Circuit made it clear that his hands are far from tied under their reasoning. In its 174. Dragging red herrings even further, one might imagine the crazy case of a vindictive lawyer who presents President Trump with a page from Middlemarch or some other entirely-unrelated text purporting to be the order and President Trump signs such a text without reading it. See GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH (David Carroll ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986). As a matter of interpretation, President Trump's speaker meaning would still control just at it did in the error example above. Having not read the text, he could not be said to have meant it to supersede his speaker meaning. As a matter of construction, however, we would have little choice but to construe the "order" as unenforceable gibberish for the lack of reasonable legal notice it would provide to those it purports to direct. Speakers are free to choose unconventional signifiers of their speaker meaning but communication will of course fail if addressees cannot discern the link. I can call rabbits "tibbars" if I like but no one will understand me if I do not provide sufficient notices of my unconventional meaning. Such notice could perhaps come from people asking me what I meant by this one word but an executive order askew in every word would no doubt be beyond any such redemption at least as a matter of construction. In other words, here there was a clear plan that was quickly implemented in the First Executive Order and then in the Second Executive Order. Additionally, this case was "unique" because government actors "seldom, if ever, announce on the record that they are pursuing a particular course of action because of their desire to discriminate." 178 And here, of course, "the private speaker and the government actor are one and the same," 179 a one-and-the-same person who, again, tweeted: "People, the lawyers and the courts can call it whatever they want, but I am calling it what we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!" 180 Should new events or new information arise arguably requiring further executive orders, the "substantial, specific connection" may no longer exist between such further orders and the previous statements. This will be a matter for further factual analysis. As the court notes: "Whether a specific statement continues to taint a government action is a fact-specific inquiry for the court evaluating the statement."
181 From a national security standpoint, it is unfortunate that President Trump has created a suspicious cloud around himself, but it would be disingenuous, be irresponsible, run counter to the rule of law, 182 and disrespect the Presidency itself 183 to ignore what a President has said and actually meant.
iii. The Principle of Balance?
As discussed above, where we believe a speaker wishes to be relevant, to act lawfully, and to otherwise act in good faith, we by definition will assume that the speaker does not mean to speak erroneously, unlawfully, irrationally, or incoherently even if the speaker's words can be taken as such. 184 Instead, in such a case, we try to interpret the speaker's words in a lawful, correct, rational, and coherent way in order to recover the real speaker meaning. A similar rationale can be used to justify such canons of construction as the constitutionality canon, which would, in appropriate cases, attempt to read language in a constitutional rather than unconstitutional manner. 185 However, the principle of balance by definition does not apply to unlawful speech where the evidence contradicts the general presumption that speakers do not mean to speak unlawfully. 186 Here, we have the President, as the Fourth Circuit noted, expressly stating that he is using territorial references as a substitute for references to Muslims: "On July 17, 2016, when asked about a tweet that said, 'Calls to ban Muslims from entering the U.S. are offensive and unconstitutional,' then-candidate Trump responded, 'So you call it territories. OK? We're gonna do territories. '" 187 Under any reasonable analysis, Mr. Trump expressly refers to a Muslim ban. Doing so, he rebuts the necessary presumption of lawfulness for the principle of balance to apply. Were we to apply the principle anyway and somehow find neutral territorial references, we would be changing-rather than finding-President Trump's consistent speaker meaning here. that "an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF In doing so, we would also be ignoring the anaphoric use of "territories" for "Muslims" discussed above: "People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can't use the word Muslim. Remember this. And I'm okay with that, because I'm talking territory instead of Muslim." 189 Again, anaphora points backwards in time to some antecedent. 190 Like defined terms in a contract, we see territories expressly used to replace prior references to Muslims with further instruction to "remember this."
191 Thus, the principle of balance simply would not apply here.
iv. "Politeness" and Speaker Meaning Finally, as the politeness principle discussed above recognizes, speakers will often choose less offensive words for their speaker meaning, but this does not change their speaker meaning. 192 Talk of restricting "territories" may be less offensive than talk of restricting "Muslims," but the actual speaker meaning remains the same. So, again, we recall: "Oh, you can't use the word Muslim . . . . I'm okay with that, because I'm talking territory instead of Muslim."
193 And, when the principle of politeness comes into play, we must remember it is used for social purposes rather than for changing the meaning of references. If contextual and other evidence indicates the speaker meant to refer to Muslims, the politeness principle does not change this fact.
V. JUDGING PRESIDENTIAL SPEAKER MEANING
Since interpretation and construction of executive orders involve matters of law, 194 when seeking Presidential and speaker meaning, we should ask ourselves what a reasonable judge thoroughly versed 195 in legal theory, legal practice, 196 and semiotics (including pragmatics) reviewing all the relevant evidence would conclude about such speaker meaning. Since judges review matters of law, 197 such an approach makes logical sense. Additionally, because judges must comply with the rules of judicial and professional conduct, 198 these hypothetical judges thoroughly versed in legal theory, practice, and semiotics (including pragmatics) would be bound by impartiality and other standards not upon binding non-lawyer readers.
199
All that said, however, we should remember that we are not ultimately substituting a hypothetical judge's meaning for the President's or the legislature's. First, if we substitute a judge's meaning for speaker meaning in the case of executive orders, we subvert the rule of law in the manner noted above because we replace the President's meaning with another's meaning. 200 Second, judging may improve with time and this may lead to improved and potentially-different understandings of Presidential meaning. Third, despite best efforts, our reasonable judge's meaning at any point in time may just be wrong due to lack of sufficient evidence or other matters. Fourth, our reasonable judges' conclusions at any point in time may be incomplete because, as one example, general terms permit development over time. For example, a judge deciding the meaning of "concealed dangerous weapons" before the invention of a pen-sized death ray would likely not imagine the latter covered by the former. 201 A future judge interpreting the phrase after invention of such a new device might well reach a different conclusion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although correct understandings of the President's First and Second Executive Orders demonstrate the unfortunate fact that Presidents can and do at times act unlawfully, we have seen that we must nonetheless put only the President's speaker meaning behind the President's words. As we have seen, rule of law (including respect for the office of the Presidency itself) requires such respect for the original Presidential speaker. 202 We should therefore ask ourselves how a reasonable judge thoroughly versed in legal theory, practice, and semiotics (including pragmatics) would weigh all the relevant evidence of such meaning in all the relevant contexts. 203 Where such a judge would interpret and construe 204 the speaker meaning of Presidential directives as unlawful, we must do the same.
In light of the discussion in Section II.C, such a reasonable judge must recognize that context is essential for accurate interpretation. Even where words are used in their dictionary senses, most words have multiple such senses which context must parse. 205 Additionally, words are often used in ways that deviate from prescribed or model usage (such as the phrase "It's a full moon tonight" used to direct workers to work late or when various "territories" are substituted for "Muslims" 206 ). These usage deviations further require context to discern accurate speaker meaning. 207 Furthermore, words can be used in ways that only make sense in light of prior discourse context (as in, for example, the phrase "Bring me what I mentioned yesterday" or "Islam hates us"). 208 
